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Abstract
In this paper, we build a dynamic game model of quantity competition to explain the
price difference between continuing exporters and exits. Continuing exports are forward
looking and they may intentionally set a lower price in the export market at current
stage to crowd out the competitors to maximize the overall expected profit in their total
life period. Using a large sample of matched panel data of Chinese firms from firm-level
production data and product-level trade data, we find that after controlling the most
important determinants of export price as well as the firm-year-specific effects, continuing
exporters charge a price 42.4%-54.0% lower than the price level charged by future exits
in China.
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1. Introduction
Trade models with firm heterogeneity generate rich predictions for not only firm
productivity but also export prices. Continuing exporters are expected to charge
less than occasional exporters who sometimes exit from international market, since
continuing exporters are more productive and have lower mark up (Aw, Chuang
and Roberts, 1999; Melitz, 2003; Eaton, Eslava, Kugler and Tybout, 2007). For
instance, Aw et al (1999) show that average productivity is highest for continuing
exporters followed by the group of entrants, exits, and non-exporters. In addition
to productivity, market share and product quality are also key determinants driv-
ing export prices (Atkeson and Burstein; 2008; Manova and Zhang, 2012; Fan,
Li and Yeaple, 2014; Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2015). For example, Fan, Li and
Yeaple (2014) show that trade liberalization induce China’s producers to upgrade
the quality of the goods and raise its export price. But such effect is evident in
industries where the scope for quality differentiation is large, which is consistent
with their model. Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015) also show that input trade liberal-
ization in China raise the export price, but such effect is specific to firms sourcing
inputs from developed economies and exporting output to high-income countries.
This is consistent with the observation in Manova and Zhang (2012).1 Such export
price effect caused by market share and product quality during trade liberalization
can only be effective for continuing exporters since exits from export market will
not make use of the trade liberalization.
1In addition, there are other studies to investigate the within-exporter price variation from
other perspective. For instance, Johnson (2012) show that export prices are increasing in the
difficulty of entering the destination market in the majority of sectors. Ge, Lai and Zhu (2015)
show that foreign-owned firms charge about 28 percent higher prices than Chinese exporters in
export market, which is the multinational price premium.
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The mechanism above to explain the systematic price differentiation between
continuing exporters and exits is from static setting and comparative static analysis
by assuming that firm care about current profit. However, from dynamic point
of view, continuing exports are forward looking and they may intentionally set a
lower price in the export market at current stage to crowd out the competitors
to maximize the overall expected profit in their total life period. Thus, in this
paper, we build a simple dynamic model of quantity competition to show such
price pattern, in which, other things equal, when a firm observes its productivity
level and foresees its exit from the export market next period, it will charge higher
prices this period to maximize the current profit. On the contrast, once a firm
which will continue to stay in a market, it has the incentive to reduce its current
price to foreclose some competitors from this market in order to increase its profit
in the future periods.
China offers an ideal setting to test our model’s predictions. The Chinese Cus-
tom office collects the transaction level data of Chinese exporting firms. We can
observe the price of each product produced by each firm exported to particular
market in specific year. The comprehensive information enables us to make com-
parison of the price difference between continuing exporters and exit exporters.
Using a large sample of matched panel data of Chinese firms from firm-level pro-
duction data and product-level trade data, we find that after controlling the most
important determinants mentioned above of export price as well as the firm-year-
specific effects, continuing exporters charge a price 42.4%-54.0% lower than the
price level charged by future exits in China.
Besides the huge export price literature we discussed above, our paper is also
closely related to the dynamic game literature. For example, Gallant et al. (2012)
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document that in the pharmaceutical industry, the generical drug firms tend to
enter some currently unprofitable markets to gain competitive advantage in the
future drug markets. Amisano and Gioretti (2013) emphasize the important role
of a firm’s early market entry behaviors on its profit in the following periods.
Rodrigue and Tan (2015) also claim that when an exporting firm penetrate into a
new export market, it tends to charge a lower price in the early periods to attract
more consumers and build its reputation and increase its profit in the following
periods. These papers underscore the impact of dynamic consideration on the
firm-level behaviors. Different from these papers, in our model a firm’s price and
quantity choice not only affect its own current profit but also the profit of other
firms. As such the benefits for continuing firms to reduce their price is to decrease
the profit of their competitors and force them to exit the market. This will decrease
the market competition in the future periods and hence increase the continuing
firms’ profit.
The rest of paper will proceed as follows, in section 2 we introduce the dynamic
model of quantity competition. Section 3 describes the data sets and the empirical
results. The last section concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 Basic set up
Following Atkeson and Burnstein (2008), we assume the representative consumer’s
preference is given by
4
E0
∑∞
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− lt)
u(ct, 1− lt) = ln
[
cut (1− lt)1−u
]
where ct denotes the consumption of final good, and lt denotes the working hours
at time t. The final good is produced by a competitive firm using a continuum
input yjt for j ∈ [0, 1] taking a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form:
ct =
[∫ 1
0
y
1− 1
η
jt
] η
η−1
Therefore, the price index Pit for the final consumption is given by Pt =[∫ 1
0
P 1−ηjt
] 1
1−η
and the inverse demand function of products in sector j is given by
Pjt
Pt
=
(
yjt
ct
)− 1
η
. Pjt is the price of yjt. In each input sector, there are only K firms,
as such the output in each input sector is given by: yjt =
[∑K
i=1
(qijt)
ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
,
where qijt is sales of firm i in sector j at time t. The corresponding price index
in sector j can be written as Pjt =
[∑K
k=1
(Pijt)
1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ
and the inverse demand
function for product i within sector j is given by
Pijt
Pjt
=
(
qijt
yjt
)− 1
ρ
. Thus, we have
the demand function of product i, which is obtained by multiplying the demand
function of products in sector j and the demand function for product i within
sector j:
pijt
Pt
=
(
qijt
yjt
)− 1
ρ
(
yjt
ct
)− 1
η
. (1)
Upon above basic set up, we also have the following market structure assump-
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tions:
(1) Goods are imperfect substitutes: ρ <∞.
(2) Goods within a sector are more substitutable than goods across sectors:
1 < η < ρ.
(3) Firms play a dynamic game of quantity competition. In particular, each
firm picks its quantity at each period to maximize its discounted profit. We further
assume that firm i cannot observe qkjt at period t if firm k does not exit, instead,
it can observe qkjt at period t+ 1. In addition, firm i can observe a zero quantity
of firm k if it generates a negative profit in period t−1 and exit at period t.2 Each
firm uses the total sales of other survived firms in the last period to proxy the total
output of the other firms in the current period.3 Mathematically, E
∑
k 6=i
qkj,t =∑
k 6=i
qkj,t−1.
Different from a static setting, firm i needs to balance the pain in the current
period and the gain in the future if it does not exit from the market. In particular,
firm i can increase its quantity in period t intentionally which reduces the price
index Pjt in sector j, and as such, some least productive firms will be crowded out
of the market, thus, firm i can make more profit in the next period and increase
the overall discounted profit.
(4) At each period, firm i suffers a bad shock with probability (1− β), and for
any firms suffering the bad shock are forced to exit the market. At the meanwhile,
some new firms born in each period, and they enter the market to replace the
2Here we require that any firm generating a negative profit in a period has to exit the market
at the end of the period.
3We call this assumption as bounded rationality, and this assumption implies that firm i does
not consider the response of firm k to its quantity choice at current period. One explanation
could be in the reality it is costly to find all other firms’ response to the firm its own quantity
choice.
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firms suffering bad shocks. In the equilibrium, the number of exit firms equals the
number of entrants, and they have the same productivity distribution. 4
(5) Firm i needs to pay a fixed cost, f in each period.
2.2. Equilibrium of continuing exporting firms.
With all the above assumptions, firm i with productivity level ϕijt maximizes
the following discounted profit which contains current profit and the value of future
profit subject to the inverse demand functions for product i described in equation
(1), which is the optimization of continuing exporting firms (with wage normalized
to 1):
max
qijt
(pijt − 1
ϕijt
)qijt − f + βV
(
Et
∑
k 6=i
qkj,t+1
)
⇔ max
qijt
(pijt − 1
ϕijt
)qijt − f + βV
(∑
k 6=i,pikj,t≥0
qkj,t
)
s.t.
pijt
Pt
=
(
qijt
yjt
)− 1
ρ
(
yjt
ct
)− 1
η
Where, the first order condition(FOC) is:
(
1− 1
ρ
)
q
− 1
ρ
ijt ŷjtŷ
1
ρ
− 1
η
jt c
1
η
t Pt +
(
1
ρ
− 1
η
)
ŷ
1
ρ
− 1
η
−1
jt ŷ
1
ρ
jtq
− 1
ρ
ijt c
1
η
t Pt
− 1
ϕijt
+
∂V
∂At+1
∂At+1
∂qijt
= 0
⇒
[(
1− 1
ρ
)
+
(
1
ρ
− 1
η
)
ŝijt
]
pijt =
1
ϕijt
− ∂V
∂At+1
∂At+1
∂qijt
4In the steady state,
∑
j 6=iqj,t is constant as all firms, incumbents or new entrants, at period
t + 1 will behave as in period t. Therefore, the prediction of each firm about other firms’ total
quantity is correct.
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where ŝijt is firm i’s conjectural market share in sector j at period t, which is
defined as ŝijt =
q1−ρijt∑
k q
1−ρ
kjt
.5 Similarly, ŷjt is firm i’s conjecture of the total output
in sector j at period t, which is defined as ŷj,t =
(
q
ρ−1
ρ
ij,t +
∑
k 6=i,pikj,t≥0 q
ρ−1
ρ
kj,t−1
) ρ
ρ−1
.
Lastly, At+1 = Et
∑
k 6=i qkj,t+1, which is used to simplify the notation.
2.3. The cutoff equilibrium of exits
The least productive firms who know they will exit the market, only maximize
the current profit without considering the impact of its price or quantity on the
future discounted profit subject to the its demand function, thus we name this
condition as static setting.6
ϕ∗j,t = inf
{
ϕ : max
(
pij,t − 1
ϕ
)
qij,t = f
}
where qij,t = Φjtp
−ρ
ij,t
Φjt = P
ρ
t ŷ
1− ρ
η
jt c
ρ
η
t
Assume firm i is the firm with the least productivity, and the optimization of
5Note that as assumed above, firm i cannot observe its competitors’ current output levels
when it decides its own quantity. As such, firm i speculate its market share by assuming all
other firms’ output in period t is identical to that in period t− 1.
6The least survived firms have to maximize its current profit to obtain zero profit to stay in
the market.
8
(
pijt − 1ϕ
)
qijt implies that
(
1− 1
ρ
)
pij,t +
(
1
ρ
− 1
η
)
pij,t
q
ρ−1
ρ
ij,t
ŷ
ρ−1
ρ
j,t
=
1
ϕ∗
⇒
(
1− 1
ρ
)
pijt +
(
1
ρ
− 1
η
)
pijtŝijt =
1
ϕ∗
⇒ psijt =
1
ϕijt[(
1− 1
ρ
)
+
(
1
ρ
− 1
η
)
ŝijt
] (3)
where psijt is the optimal price for firm i if it will exit in period t + 1. This price
maximizes firm i’s current profit, and it referred to as the static optimal price.
With the equation (??), we reach the following lemmas:
Lemma 1. The profit of firms with cutoff productivity is increasing in other firms’
price level (Proof of Lemma 1 is in the appendix),
∂pikj,t+1
∂pijt
> 0
Lemma 2. The cutoff at period t+1 is decreasing in firm i’s price level, which
implies that firm i can increase its quantity in period t to squeeze out some firms
in period t+1.
∂ϕ∗j,t+1
∂pijt
< 0
Proof. This result can be derived directly from Lemma 1 that other firm cannot
stay in the market after the decreasing of pijt.
Lemma 3. The expected total output in period t+1 is increasing in firm i’s current
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price:
∂
∑
k 6=i,pikj,t≥0
q
ρ−1
ρ
kj,t
∂pijt
> 0
Proof. It can be derived directly from the implication of Lemma 2 that the number
of other surviving firms will increase when pijt increases, so the total output.
Lemma 4. The value function given the state variable At, V (At), is a decreasing
function of At (Proof of Lemma 4 is in the appendix), where At =
∑
k 6=i,pikj,t≥0
q
ρ−1
ρ
kj,t
∂V (At)
∂At
< 0
Combing these lemmas, we can get the following Proposition:
PROPOSITION: The price in the dynamic setting (continuing exporters) is
strictly lower than that in a static setting (exits), given other things equal.
pdijt =
1
ϕijt
− ∂V
∂At+1
∂At+1
∂qijt[(
1− 1
ρ
)
+
(
1
ρ
− 1
η
)
ŝijt
]
psijt =
1
ϕijt[(
1− 1
ρ
)
+
(
1
ρ
− 1
η
)
ŝijt
]
⇒ pdijt < psijt
Proof. From Lemma 4, we know ∂V
∂At+1
< 0 and from Lemma 3 which is based
on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we know ∂At+1
∂qijt
= ∂At+1
∂pijt
∂pijt
∂qit
< 0. In addition, the
equation (2) and (3) which show the price of continuing exporting firms and exits,
respectively. Thus, we can easily reach an inequality through simple comparison:
pdijt < p
s
ijt.
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The inequality tells that continuing exporters (dynamic setting) charge lower
than the exits (static setting) in the export market. As a final remark, although
the simple dynamic game of quantity competition that relies on a numerous as-
sumptions, can explain such price pattern, there could be other channels in place
which themselves are interesting to explore further for future research.
3. Price difference between continuing exporters and exits: An empir-
ical investigation
3.1. Data
We mainly rely on two disaggregated, large panel data sets in this paper,
which are firm-level production data and product-level trade data over period
2000-2006. Firm-level data comes from annual surveys of manufacturing firms,
which is collected and maintained by the China’s National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS). The dataset covers all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs with
annual sales more than RMB 5 million (which is equivalent to around 770,000 US
Dollar under current exchange rate).7 Detailed information on financial variables
such as out-put, value added, labor input, fixed capital, intermediate inputs etc is
available. It is the data source for measuring TFP, which we used as one of the
control variables in the estimation. The advantage of rich information makes the
dataset very popular in research focusing China, but it has been noticed that lots
of samples are quite noisy and are therefore misleading. Brandt, Biesebroeck and
Zhang (2012), Upward, Wang and Zheng (2013), as well as Feenstra, Li and Yu
(2014) summarize these problems and provide the necessary procedure to resolve.
7Aggregated data on the industrial sector in the annual China’s Statistical Yearbook by the
National Bureau of Statistics are compiled from this data set.
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We follow their work to clean the sample before estimation. After applying this
rigorous clean work to guarantee the quality of the production data, the filtered
firm data are reduced by about 50 percent in each year, as shown in columns I
and II in Table 1.
The product-level transaction data are obtained from China’s General Admin-
istration of Customs (GAC). It contains information of product at the 8-digit The
Harmonization System Code (HS code) level for each trading firm, including price,
quantity and value. We rely on this dataset to construct our export price variable
and firm-product continuation dummy variable and other control variables such
as market share and intermediate input price. Therefore, it is necessary to merge
these two different sourced data sets. Since each firm has a unique numerical
ID (registration code) in these two separate dataset, linking them by firm ID is
straightforward. However, the firm IDs is coded in the two datasets according
to different coding system. Thus, to increase the number of qualified matching
firms as many as possible, we follow Upward, Wang and Zheng (2013), using each
firm’s Chinese name and the year of establishment as a bridge to match, which is
deemed as the most effective way because firm names are less likely to be missing
or changed during the relatively short time period 2000-2006 (7 years) than other
information. As described in Table 1, After matching, the remaining observations
accounts for nearly 15% of the original firm-level production dataset and about
25% of the original transaction dataset, and more than half in terms of export
value. By way of comparison, our matching success rate is highly comparable to
that in other studies, such as Ge, Lai, and Zhu (2011) and Yu (2014).
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Table 1: The number of firms of two data sets before and after matching
NBS Sample GAC Sample Merged Sample
Raw firms Filtered firms Transactions Firms Firms
I II III IV V
2000 162,883 83,868 10,586,696 61,900 15,539
2001 169,031 100,279 12,667,685 67,360 19,072
2002 181,557 110,706 14,032,675 75,431 21,871
2003 196,222 129,659 18,069,404 90,664 26,721
2004 277,004 199,289 21,402,355 112,823 41,822
2005 271,835 198,945 24,889,639 123,437 44,821
2006 301,960 224,908 16,685,377 164,822 47,102
3.2. Specification and TFP
To investigate the price difference between continuing exporters and exits, we
use the following estimated equation:
Pijt = c+ βDit + δXijt + σi + σj + σt + εijt (2)
where i denotes to firm, j is the product index, and t is the year. The continuing
exporting dummy variable for firm i, Dit, is our main causal variable. It is defined
as that if a firm exports in year t and year t + 1, then in year t it is treated as
an continuing exporter.8 For the robustness check, we also define the continuing
exporter in year t as that if a firm exports in year t year t + 1 and year t + 2.9
Readers will find later that our results are not sensitive to the definition of an
continuing exporter.
Xijt includes our control variables such as firm level total factor productivity
(TFP), firm-level imported intermediate input price to control for the quality of
8Thus, only the 2000-2005 period sample enters the equation.
9Thus, in this case only the 2000-2004 period sample enters the equation.
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imported material, and firm-product-destination level market share measured by
firm-product sales divided by the total sales of all Chinese firms producing the
same product in the same market. Since continuing exporters are more productive
and thus have lower mark up (e.g.,Eaton, Eslava, Kugler and Tybout, 2007).
In addition, market share and product quality are also key determinants driving
export prices(Etkeson and Burstein; 2008; Fan, Li and Yeaple, 2014).
Firm level TFP is always deemed as the contribution to output other than
labor and capital or intermediate material. According to features of the data used
in the paper, there are different estimation methods. We adopt TFP estimated by
two methods. The first follows Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) method
to estimate the firm-product level TFP:
lnTFPikt = ln qikt − αk ln kikt − αl ln likt − αm lnmikt (3)
where qikt is the physical units of output i exported by firm k in year t across all
destinations. kikt, likt and mikt represent the firm-product-year measures of capital,
labor and materials, respectively. αk, αl, and αm are the input share for capital,
labor and intermediate materials, respectively.
We assume that the output of each product is produced by a Cobb-Douglas
function. To compute firm-product level productivity, we need to calculate input
shares for labor, materials and capital, αl, αm and αk, respectively, for each prod-
uct. Let ω˜kt denote firm k’s total nominal wage payments in year t. Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) suggest that the wage bill, ω˜kt tends to underestimate the labor
share in the Chinese manufacturing data. Following their approach, we multiply
each firm’s wage bill by a constant parameter, ρ˜, to inflate the wage bill in each
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firm. We determine the size of the constant parameter by choosing the parameter
so that the aggregate labor compensation in the manufacturing sector matches the
labor share in national accounts (roughly 50 percent).
Specifically, we denote the total, observed payments to workers as
tω =
∑
k
∑
t
ρ˜ω˜kt = ρ˜
∑
k
∑
t
ω˜kt = ρ˜t˜ω
where ρ˜ is the unknown inflation parameter we need to determine and t˜ω denotes
the total observed labor compensation. We denote total revenues tr and total
intermediate materials tm. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) suggest that the ratio of
total wage payments to value-added is roughly 50% from the Chinese national
accounts and input-output tables. This implies that
tω
tr − tm = 0.5⇒
ρ˜t˜ω
tr − tm = 0.5⇒ ρ˜ = 0.5
tr − tm
t˜ω
After ρ˜ is determined, we calculate the labor share in each of exporting industries
we focus on as:
αl =
1
N˜
∑
t
∑
k
ρ˜ω˜kt
r˜kt
where r˜kt are the firm k’s nominal revenues, and N˜ is the total number of firm
observations in each year. Similarly, we calculate the intermediate materials share
as the average share of intermediate inputs in total revenues,
αm =
1
N˜
∑
t
∑
k
ρ˜m˜kt
r˜kt
where m˜kt is the total value of intermediate materials firm k used in year t. Fi-
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nally, in the absence of reliable capital share information, we follow Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) and assume constant returns to scale so that αk = 1 − αl − αm.
We have alternatively tried estimating the input shares, and productivity, using
control function methods (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). We find very similar
measures of input shares and productivity.
The second is OP method, which was first proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996)
and has been widely used in the literature (e.g., De Loecker, 2007, 2011; De Loeck-
er and Warzynski, 2012; Feenstra, Li and Yu, 2014; Yu, 2014). The essence of this
approach is to use investment as proxy for unobservable productivity. Compared
with OLS, it can overcome the problems of simultaneity and selectivity bias. In
considering that technology varies across industries and production function is es-
timated sector by sector based on 2-digit Chinese industry code. When estimating
the productivity, value added of firms is used as explained variable, the number
of employees is treated as labor input, and investment is deducted according to
perpetual inventory method with data of net fixed assets and the depreciation
rate. The measured TFP is expected to capture the firm’s true technical efficien-
cy. However, here measured TFP might also reflect price heterogeneity across
firms (De Loecker, 2011; De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). The ideal way to
solve this problem is to remove price difference by using firm-specific price deflator
(Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008). Unfortunately, these price deflators
are unavailable, therefore, as many other studies, e.g., De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012) and Yu (2014), we use industrial output price to deflate the firm’s value
added. It is much more difficult to get real capital and investment for two reasons:
first, firms do not report fixed investment; and second, firms report information
on the value of their fixed capital stock at original purchase prices. We follow the
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procedures provided by Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012), estimating capital
stock with real values based on the information of industrial capital stock growth
rate and price index.
3.3. Empirical results
Table 2 and 3 report the estimation results of empirical specification. Table 2
defines a firm to be continuing exporter in year t when this firm exports in both
year t and year t+ 1 and Table 3 defines a firm to be continuing exporter in year
t when this firm exports in years t, t + 1 and t + 2. Column (1)-(4) uses firm-
product TFP and Column (5) uses TFP by OP method. After controlling firm
and year fixed effects, we add the controls one by one for continuation dummy,
productivity, market share and intermediate input price. The main message is
that in each regression, continuing exporters charge a price lower than the price
level charged by future exits no matter what continuation is used or TFP is used.
After controlling the most important determinants of export price as well as the
firm-year-specific effects, we still find that continuing exporters charge a price
42.4%-54.0% lower than the price level charged by future exits in China.10
10The figure is calculated by [Exp(β)− 1].
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Table 2: The Impact of Continuation on Firms’ Exporting Price-First definition of continuation
1 2 3 4 5(OP)
D cont -0.7142*** -0.4719*** -0.4745*** -0.5511*** -0.7759***
(0.0423) (0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0536) (0.0554)
TFP -4.3581*** -4.3584*** -4.8137*** -0.6236***
(0.0115) (0.0115) 0.0149 0.0258
m share 0.3901** 0.8342*** 0.3441**
(0.1283) (0.1600) (0.1677)
Mprice 1.47e-06*** 2.24e-06***
(1.90e-07) (2.09e-07)
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1016 0.1239 0.1240 0.1306 0.1039
# of obs 1,075,189 1,075,189 1,075,189 709,411 709,411
Notes: D cont equals to 1 in year t when a firm export in both year t and year t + 1, otherwise D cont takes
value 0. Standard errors are in parenthesis, *** and ** , respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, and 5%
levels.
Table 3: The Impact of Continuation on Firms’ Exporting Price–Second definition of continuation
1 2 3 4 5(OP)
D cont -0.9094*** -0.6784*** -0.6793*** -0.7352*** -0.6916***
(0.0515) (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0655) (0.0673)
TFP -3.9150*** -3.9151*** -4.3104*** -0.6712***
(0.0139) (0.0139) 0.0179 0.0325
m share 0.2089 0.6884*** 0.2189
(0.1744) (0.2082) 0.2164
Mprice 3.97e-07* 8.19e-07***
(2.28e-07) (2.47e-07)
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1022 0.1078 0.1078 0.1139 0.1039
# of obs 692,150 692,150 692,150 462,298 462,298
Notes: D cont equals to 1 in year t when a firm export in year t, t+ 1 and t+ 1, otherwise D cont takes value 0.
Standard errors are in parenthesis, *** and ** , respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, and 5% levels.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, we build a simple dynamic game of quantity competition to show
that continuing exporters (dynamic setting) could charge a lower price than the
exits (static setting) in the export market intentionally. Using a large sample of
matched panel data of Chinese firms from firm-level production data and product-
level trade data, we find that after controlling the most important determinants
of export price as well as the firm-year-specific effects, continuing exporters charge
a price 42.4%-54.0% lower than the price level charged by future exits in China.
The results are robust to using different firm TFP measures and continuing export
definition. As a final remark, although there could be other channels which can
explain the price pattern, our simple dynamic model provide a new perspective to
explain the observed price disparity between continuing and exit exporters.
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Proof to Lemma 1
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Given all other firms price unchanged, only the price of firm i changes. When
all firms optimally choose their price and firm i chooses paijt, the optimal price
and profit of firm k in period t+ 1 are pakj,t+1 and pi
a
ij,t+1, respectively. If firm i
decreases its price to pbijt at period t, and all other firms keep prices unchanged,
the optimal price and profit of firm k in this situation are pbkj,t+1 and pi
b
kj,t+1,
respectively. If firm k charges pbkj,t+1 when firm i charges pijt, we denote the profit
of firm k is pickj,t+1.
Obviously, piaij,t+1 > pi
c
kj,t+1 because p
a
kj,t+1 is the optimal price at pijt. Now we
need to show that pickj,t+1 > pi
b
kj,t+1. As firm k does not change its price level, its
unit profit keep the same in both cases, which is:
qkj,t+1 = χŷ
1− ρ
η
jt+1
χ = P ρc
ρ
η
t+1p
−ρ
kj,t+1
Thus,
∂qkj,t+1
∂pijt
= χ
(
1− ρ
η
)
ŷ
− ρ
η
jt+1
[
∂ŷj,t+1
∂qkj,t+1
∂qkj,t+1
∂pijt
+
∂ŷj,t+1
∂qijt
∂qijt
∂pijt
]
⇒
{
1 + χ
(
ρ
η
− 1
)
ŷ
− ρ
η
j,t+1
∂ŷj,t+1
∂qkj,t+1
}
∂qkj,t+1
∂pijt
= χ
(
1− ρ
η
)
ŷ
− ρ
η
j,t+1
∂ŷj,t+1
∂qijt
∂qijt
∂pijt
The coefficient for the
∂qkj,t+1
∂pijt
is positive because ρ > η > 1 and
∂yˆj,t+1
∂qkj,t+1
> 0.
Meanwhile the right hand side is also positive as
(
1− ρη
)
< 0, and
∂qijt
∂pijt
< 0
(demand rule). These imply that
∂qkj,t+1
∂pijt
> 0. This result indicates that when
pijt changes: q
c
kj,t+1 > q
b
kj,t+1, the profit pi
c
kj,t+1 = uni prof · qckj,t+1 > uni prof ·
qbkj,t+1 = pi
b
kj,t+1. Since pi
c
kj,t+1 < pi
a
kj,t+1, we directly have pi
b
kj,t+1 < pi
a
kj,t+1.
Proof to Lemma 4
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This is solved based on the optimization of continuing exporting firms above where
the FOC is:
[(
1− 1
ρ
)
+
(
1
ρ
− 1
η
)
ŝijt
]
pijt =
1
ϕijt
− ∂V
∂At+1
∂At+1
∂qijt
Now we are going to show that ∂V∂At+1 < 0. Denote the optimal price choice of firm
i at Aat is p
a
ijt, and q
a
ijt = P
ρ
t C
ρ
η
t
(
paijt
)−ρ
ŷ
1− ρ
η
jt . If when firm i faces A
b
t , but deviate
its price to paijt, it will have the same unit profit as facing A
a
t . However, now its
sales, qbijt > q
a
ijt. This inequality is because,
∂At+1
∂qijt
= ∂At+1∂pijt
∂pijt
∂qijt
. From Lemma 3
we can get ∂At+1∂pijt > 0 and demand rules tells that
∂pijt
∂qijt
< 0, thus, ∂At+1∂qijt < 0 and
∂qijt
∂At
< 0. This result guarantee
qbijt = qijt(A
b
t) > qijt(A
a
t ) = q
a
ijt
Therefore, we conclude that when firm i deviate its price from its optimal price
to paijt when it faces A
b
t , its discounted profit is higher than V (A
a
t ). However, this
contradicts with the fact that V (Aat ) > V (A
b
t).
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